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TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE BALANCE:
HOMEOWNER AND PURCHASER TENSIONS
IN NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE STATES
Elizabeth Renuart
INTRODUCTION
fallout from the subprime
of the crisis
facing the fifth
are now meltdown.
gripping the United
economic
Wemortgage
The year
States began when large numbers of homeowners defaulted on poorly
underwritten subprime mortgage loans. The percentage of
homeowners seriously delinquent on their mortgage payments stood
at 2.23% (or almost 980,000 loans) at the dawn of 2007.1 This
percentage rose dramatically to a peak of 9.67% (or almost 4.3
million loans) by the end of 2009. As of the fourth quarter of 2011,
those numbers remain shockingly high: 7.73% of all residential
mortgage loans were seriously delinquent, i.e., almost 3.3 million
loans.2
Through securitization, the process of utilizing mortgage
loans to back investment instruments, Wall Street funded subprime
originations in excess of $480 billion in each of the peak years2005 and 2006, thereby fueling the potential hazards should the
underlying loans fail.3 There is growing evidence that the parties to
securitization deals handle and transfer the loan notes and mortgages
in a careless and, at times, fraudulent manner.4
Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
'Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey, Ql 2007 at 4,
Q4 2009 at 4. This survey defines "seriously delinquent" mortgage loans as those
that are ninety days or more delinquent or are in foreclosure.
2 Mortgage Bankers Association, NationalDelinquencySurvey, Q4 2011 at 4.
3 Inside Mortgage Finance,. 1 THE 2008 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL
ANNUAL, 2008, at 3.
4 Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure
at
available
*7-* 16,
Time
Bomb?,
Ibanez
The
States:
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1968504 (4 Wm. & MARY Bus.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)) (compiling examples of this evidence).
*
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Consequently, the foreclosing parties frequently do not
possess the right to foreclose and the resulting sales may be unlawful.
These defective sales harm homeowners when they lose their homes
to the wrong party.5 Wrongful foreclosures affect another important
group, the purchasers. If title to the property is flawed as a result,
purchasing parties potentially buy nothing and can transfer nothing.
As a result, clear title to real property acquired via foreclosure sales
in the United States may be in jeopardy. In non-judicial foreclosure
states where the doctrines of finality do not apply and state law may
permit post-sale challenges, this uncertainty is most acute.
In a previous article, I explored the recent decisions issued by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which addressed whether
the foreclosing party must be the mortgagee or possess a valid
assignment of the mortgage prior to a sale and whether this
deficiency voids the sale. I summarized the foreclosure law of
Massachusetts and compared it to the law in four other non-judicial
foreclosure states to assess whether these opinions could be
persuasive authority in those states. I then drew conclusions as to the
probability of post-sale title defects and challenges to title that
purchasers could face.
In this article, I continue that discussion by exploring the
rights and interests of homeowners and purchasers and by addressing
potential solutions to conflicts between them. To examine these
concerns, Part I describes the authority-to-foreclose issues that can
fatally infect a foreclosure sale. Part II identifies the rights and
interests of homeowners and purchasers affected by possibly
defective sales. Part III outlines selected state laws that permit or
restrict post-sale challenges to title. Finally, Part IV analyzes possible
legislative solutions to the tensions between and concerns of
homeowners and bonafide purchasers.

5

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO -11- 433, 41-42, Mortgage

Foreclosures: Documentation Problems Reveal Need for Ongoing Regulatory
at
available
Report],
GAO
[hereinafter
(2011)
Oversight
that
(noting
2012)
28,
Feb.
visited
(last
1433.pdf
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl
homeowners vacate in anticipation of imminent foreclosures and search for
alternative housing; vacant homes increase the likelihood of "crime, blight, and
declining property values).
6 Renuart, supra note 4, at *33-*38. The Massachusetts decisions reviewed
include: U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass.
2011); Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011);
Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, SUCV201101382, 2011 WL 6379284 (Mass.
Super. June 17, 2011), appeal pending (addressing the issue of whether the
foreclosing party also must possess the right to enforce the note prior to the sale).
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I. POTENTIAL FLAWS IN THE FORECLOSURE SALE PROCESS
Many types of deficiencies or fraudulent behavior can occur
in the foreclosure process. These include: the failure to provide
contractually or legally required notices; lack of authority to
foreclose; fraud in the process; rigging the sale; grossly inadequate
sale price; and other irregularity or unfairness.7 This section focuses
on two issues that fall under the category of "authority to foreclose"
that appear with some frequency in the current foreclosure crisis: the
failure of the foreclosing party to possess the right to enforce the note
and mortgage and the lack of authority to foreclose because the
homeowner is not in default.
This section also describes the consequences of these defects
upon foreclosure sales in non-judicial foreclosure states which
encompass the majority of states. In these states, lenders foreclose by
exercising the power of sale included in the security instrument.8
These foreclosures proceed with little or no judicial oversight. 9
Following a default by the homeowner, a specific party, e.g., the
mortgagee or its assignee or the trustee listed in a deed of trust, may
sell the property after it provides required notices and advertises the
sale date.' 0 Lenders benefit from the power of sale process because it
provides an inexpensive and quick remedy against defaulting
homeowners. " Depending upon state law, these sales can be
completed in twenty to one hundred twenty days. 12 From the
homeowner' s perspective, the non-judicial foreclosure process is
harsh in its treatment of homeowners because there is no judicial
oversight.13 Defects in title to foreclosed homes and the possibility of
7 Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Non-judicial Foreclosure Sales:
Extending the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraudor Unfairness, 23
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 151-156 (2006) (listing certain statutory and common
grounds to set aside a sale); Bank of America v. La Jolla Group II, 129 Cal. App.
4th 706, 713-14, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 825, 830-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
where the loan was current due to an agreement to cure, the beneficiary had no
right to foreclose under these circumstances and sale was invalid).
8 Jacobson-Greany, supra note 7, at 144-150.
9
Id at 151.
to 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.42[4]. Unless otherwise noted, the word
"mortgage," refers to the instrument that secures the debt represented by the loan
note by taking an interest in real property and includes all forms of these
instruments, such as, mortgages, deeds of trust, and security deeds.
11
12 Renuart, supra note 4, at *33.

Id

13 Jacobson-Greany,

supra note 7, at 150-151 (arguing for an expansion of the
equitable grounds available to challenge a wrongful foreclosure).
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post-sale challenges are greater because finality doctrines, such as res
judicata,do not apply. 14
A. Lack ofAuthority to Foreclose
A "mortgage loan" consists of two distinct documents: a note
and . a security agreement. 15 The loan note represents the legal
obligation to repay money advanced by the lender for use by the
borrower.1 In most states, a mortgage creates a security interest in
the borrower's real property and permits the mortgagee to foreclose
in the event of non-payment or a breach of the note or duties listed in
the security agreement.' 7
All over the country, courts are scrutinizing whether the
parties initiating foreclosures against homeowners legally possess the
authority to repossess those homes.' Authority to foreclose in this
context refers to the failure of the foreclosing entity to possess the
right to enforce the loan note and the mortgage. 19 When the authority
is absent, foreclosure sales may be reversed.
The complexities of securitization contributed to a breakdown
in the transfer of the mortgage loans from one entity to the next along
the chain of players. 20 Evidence of this carelessness and, sometimes,
fraud appears in court decisions, the findings of investigations,
studies by law professors, news reports, Congressional testimony,
and shareholder lawsuits.21
In contrast, once the judgment is final in a judicial proceeding, the usual
doctrines related to finality apply. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, I REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.18 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining that finality doctrines
eliminate most or all defenses to the action; they also protect the rights of the
purchaser at the sale and stabilize title).
' Id. at § 5.27.
16 The notes used in mortgage loan transactions usually are "promissory notes"
as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 9-102(a)(65) (" 'Promissory
note' means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation,
does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a
bank that the bank received for deposit a sum of money or funds.").
17 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.03 (Michael Allan
Wolfe ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2010) (hereinafter "4 Powell on Real
Property") (stating that in "title" states, by way of contrast, the mortgage vests legal
title in the mortgagee or beneficiary).
18 Renuart, supra note 4, at *7-*8 (text accompanying notes
17-19).
states that: "A
5.4(c)
§
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGE)
is entitled to
who
a
person
of,
or
in
behalf
by,
mortgage may be enforced only
enforce the obligation the mortgage secures."
20 Renuart, supra note 4,
at *6-*18.
21 Id. at *7-*16 (compiling examples of this
evidence).
14
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Whether lack of authority to foreclose voids the sale in the
hands of a purchaser depends on the law in each non-judicial
foreclosure state. If the sale is merely voidable, then a purchaser who
pays value and purchases without notice of any defect takes good
title.2 2 By contrast, in Massachusetts, the sale is void.23 Moreover, the
defect in title follows the property such that the purchaser cannot pass
title because the purchaser failed to obtain title of the property from
the original sale.
Elsewhere, I opine that Ibanez should be influential in other
non-judicial states, for example, Georgia and Nevada, and result in
the reversal of defective foreclosure sales. 25 For the remainder of this
essay, I will assume that lack of authority to foreclose renders the
sale void and passes no title to the purchaser.
B. No Default by the Homeowner
Lack of authority to foreclose also arises when the
homeowner has not defaulted under the terms of the note, mortgage,
or modifications thereof. For example, the homeowner and the
servicer agee to a loan modification or to a plan to cure alleged
arrearage. The homeowner fulfills her obligations but, nevertheless
the servicer initiates foreclosure. The resulting sale likely is invalid.2
Professor Porter details examples of servicer abuses, miscalculations
and poor record keeping that can result in wrongful foreclosures.2
For example, servicers fail to keep complete, accurate, and

Nelson & Whitman, supra note 14, at § 7.21; Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955
N.E.2d 884, 897 (Mass. 2011).
23 U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 50 (Mass. 2011).
24 Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 892-83 (also finding, though, that the purchaser
was not a BFP).
25 Renuart, supra note 4, at *61-*62, *69-*70.
26 The "servicer" acts on behalf of the mortgagee or its assignee to collect
the monthly payments, manage the accounts, and interact with the homeowner in
the event of disputes, requests to modify the loan, or default. Diane E. Thompson,
Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan
Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REv. 755, 759-65 (2011).
27 E.g., Bank of America v. La Jolla Group II, 129 Cal. App. th 706, 713-14,
4
28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 825, 830-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that where the loan was
current due to an agreement to cure; beneficiary had no right to foreclose under
22

these circumstances and sale was invalid).
28

See generally Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy
Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REv. 121 (2008) (illustrating the industry practices
which result in wrongful foreclosures).
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comprehensible payment records. 29 Servicers rely, in part, upon the
fee income they impose upon homeowners, such as late, property
inspection, and other default fees, which can drive loans into

default. 30
We now turn to the interests of the two parties with the most
to lose by defective foreclosures: homeowners and purchasers.
Defective sales also undermine the strong public policy supporting
the integrity of the legal and property title systems.
II. THE INTERESTS OF HOMEOWNERS, PURCHASERS, AND
THE LEGAL AND PROPERTY TITLE SYSTEMS
A. Homeowners
There are at least four major concerns of homeowners that
warrant discussion, and, possibly, protection in the context of nonjudicial foreclosures: repossession of their homes without meaningful
oversight; roadblocks to challenging the validity of the foreclosure;
losing their homes to the wrong party; and, incurring double liability.
I discuss each of these issues in order.
First, the parties seeking to sell a home, even if the
homeowner is behind on payments, should strictly comply with
foreclosure requirements in states without readily available judicial
oversight. After all, a family's home is at stake. Typically, nonjudicial foreclosure is a quicker, easier, and less costly method to
repossess a borrower's home than accomplishing the same result
through the judicial procedure.31 In effect, non-judicial foreclosure is
a form of self-help repossession of one of the most important assets a
person can own-her home. In the words of one law professor:
Courts have noted that a power of sale contained in
a deed of trusi [or mortgage] is a 'harsh method' of
enforcing lenders' right. Indeed, non-judicial
foreclosure sales are 'much liable to abuse' and
should be 'jealously watched by courts of equity.'
With the possibility of abuse in the system, it makes
sense that debtors should be protected from the
Id. at 131-132, 134-135
3

0 Id. at 127; Thompson, supra note 26, at 803-805 (describing why and how

servicer entitlement to fee income encourages foreclosures).
3' Nelson & Whitman, supra note 14, at §§ 7.11, 7.19 (comparing judicial and
non-judicial foreclosure).
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wrongful loss of their property. 32
In short, the homeowner who mortgages her property can lose it
without ready access to the courts. 33
Contrast this situation with that of tenants in possession of a
leasehold interest in real property and of borrowers who owe
unsecured debt. In the first scenario, the landlord normally must file a
lawsuit in the appropriate court to terminate the tenancY based upon
non-payment of the rent and seek an order of eviction. EssentiallY
the landlord must prove its right to possession of the premises.
Likewise, in the second situation, the unsecured creditor must pursue
collection through the judicial system if its borrower defaults on the
debt and fails to repay the arrears. 36 Like the landlord, the creditor
must prove its right to collect on the debt. Only after the court enters
a judgment against the borrower may the creditor execute on the
judgment by obtaininq writs to attach the borrower's property to
satisfy the judgment. Outside of these contexts, imagine for a
moment the outcry that would arise if one business could repossess
and sell another's business without first possessing the authority to
proceed.
Second, mistakes, misbehavior, and outright fraud by those
initiating the foreclosure occur. 38 Homeowners have a legitimate
Jacobson-Greany, supra note 7, at 167 (quoting Sys. Inv. Corp. v. Union
Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 735, 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971), and Pugh v. Richmond, 425
S.W.2d 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
3 The burden rests on the homeowner to challenge the initiation of a nonjudicial foreclosure either by filing an affirmative action seeking an injunction or
by filing a bankruptcy to obtain the automatic stay, if eligible to do so. If the
homeowner is strapped for cash, the cost of pursuing these remedies pre-sale is
daunting. Once the sale occurs, the burden remains on the homeowner to challenge
the validity of the sale on the grounds available under state law. The same cost
roadblock arises but the permissible reasons to contest the sale shrink. Renuart,
supranote 4, at *74.
32

34 ROBERT S. SCHOSKINsKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT H

6.5, at 400; 6:11, at 410-412 (Lawyer's Co-operative 1980 & West Supp. 2011)
(noting that judicial eviction is required in a growing majority of states).
" Id. § 6:17, at 421-425.
36

ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTERBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, 33-34 (ASPEN PUBLISHERS 2009).

n Warren & Lawrence, supra note 34; See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc, 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (reversing the issuance
of an injunction prohibiting the debtor from transferring its assets before the
creditor obtained a money judgment).
38 See Porter,supra note 28,
at 123-28.
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interest in a legal process to challenge foreclosure for lack of
authority. Nontheless, former homeowners simply do not have the
resources to challenge defective sales in great numbers. 39 The legal
obstacles to initiating and prevailing in such contests are daunting.
For example, the state may prevent or limit the filing of post-sale
challenges. 40 In some states, delivery of the foreclosure deed to the
purchaser or the land registry office creates a presumption of
compliance with sPecific contractual and legal requirements in favor
of the purchaser.4 Moreover, a state may require the homeowner to
tender the arrearage in an action to cancel the foreclosure deed or
plead the conditions showing that tender is inequitable.4 2
Third, the wrong party may foreclose and, consequently,
profit from its actions. Such a result may occur when the foreclosing
party does not possess the right to enforce the note and mortgage at
the relevant time or the homeowner has not defaulted. This concern
dovetails with legal maxims often applied in equitable actions. For
example, the doctrine of clean hands states that "a party cannot seek
equitable relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has
violated an equitable principle, such as good faith."4 3 To be sure, a
defaulting homeowner is not wholly innocent. Nonetheless, the law
should protect such homeowners from the wrong party taking their
home because, when weighing the equities between the two, the
wrong party has no right to force a sale and is a mere trespasser. As,
United States District Court Judge Young explains: "It is clear ...
that [the homeowner] is substantially behind in her payments and
appears unable to remediate her default. This, however, does not
render her an outlaw, subject to having her home seized by whatever
bank or loan servicer may first lay claim to it. She still has legal
rights."4 4
3 Renuart, supra note 4, at 74. The resources necessary to commence litigation
include: the money to become current on the loan, if in default and to hire an
attorney and the energy and desire to fight for a home in which they no longer live.
40 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 33-81 1(C) (2012) (limiting the filing of a challenge to
5:00 P.M. on the day before the sale); NEV. REV. STAT. 107.080(5) (2010) (creating
a ninety day limitation period on the filing of a post-sale challenge).
41See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-81 1(B) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(c)
(2011).
42 HARRY D. MILLER AND MARVIN B. STARR, 4 CAL. REAL ESTATE § 10:212
(3d. ed. updated Oct. 2010).
43 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 286 (8th ed. 2004). See also California's
codification of a general prohibition against profiting from wrongful behavior.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 ("No one can take advantage of his own wrong.").
4 Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Nebraska, No. 11-1 1098-WGY, 2011 WL
5925525, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 2011).
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Fourth, if the foreclosing party does not possess the right to
enforce the note, the actual holder of the note could attempt to collect
after the sale, which potentially subjects the homeowner to double
liability.45 This result is patently unfair to the homeowner even if she
has defaulted.
B. Purchasers
There are two common types of purchasers at foreclosure
sales: foreclosing or affiliated parties and unaffiliated parties. The
foreclosing party is often the bank acting as trustee on behalf of a
trust containing a pool of securitized mortgages.4 6 It will purchase the
property at the sale if no one bids or the bids are unsatisfactory.
When this occurs, the properties are held by the bank in its "realestate-owned" (REO) inventory until re-sale to third parties.
Generally, purchasers at foreclosure sales or of REO
properties consist of affiliated or unaffiliated investors and of
individuals who wish to live in the home following purchase. There
appears to be little national or state-by-state data on purchaser
identity.4 7 In Arizona, a state with one of the highest foreclosure
Id. at * 1l (and cases cited therein).
Renuart, supra note 4, at * 17-* 18 (identifying the trustee bank as the party
to the securitization that is to acquire the notes and mortgages and hold them in
trust for the benefit of the investors, according to the deal documents).
47 Publicly available data shows that, nationally, banks purchased about 66%
of the 355,000 residential properties auctioned at their foreclosure sales in 2006.
3 (Oct. 2011),
Trends
Housing and Mortgage
CoreLogic, U.S.
http://www.corelogic.com/aboutus/researchtrends/assetupload file312_14168.pdf (last visited March 22, 2012).
Banks re-sold approximately 90% of their 2006 REO inventory; of that, half was
resold within six months; but the banks could not dispose of 21% of the properties
until more than 12 months after the property entered REO status. Ten percent
remained in inventory as of the second quarter of 2010. Id.
Nearly 180,000, or 85 percent, of REO sales (of 2006 auctions), were
sold again within the subsequent five years. Over 11,000, or 5
percent, of the REO sales sold three times within the subsequent five
years, and nearly 70 percent of these 'churned' properties were
initially purchased with cash. This is a persistent finding throughout
auctions in later years - properties initially sold with cash are much
more likely to transact multiple times again. Only 2 percent of REO
mortgaged sales went back into REO within the five years since the
initial auction. This indicates that REO recidivism is not as
significant a concern as previously thought.
As of the end of the third quarter of 2011, REO inventory declined 1.5% from
$51.3 billion the previous quarter and 5% lower than a year ago. John Prior, Banks
45

46
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rates, auctions attract droves of investors "who are eager for cut-rate
houses that they can resell or rent out . . .,,48 Other available
information sheds light on the type of purchaser in the subset of sales
of REO property, rather than the larger universe of all foreclosure
auctions. One study shows that of the properties entering REO in
Fulton County, Georgia in 2005-2008 and the first four months of
2009, the sales of REO property totaled 21,474.49 Of these sales, the
percentage of "likely investor" buyers ranged from 39.4% to 44.3%.'o
A bank with REO inventory is faced with property it does not
want to own, possible title, repair, lien, and tax issues that it must
clear before it can sell, mounting maintenance costs, and other
headaches. The larger the inventory, the faster the bank will want to
sell and the lower a price it might be willing to accept. 5 ' As a result, a
bank's major concerns include: obtaining clear title to the foreclosed
property so that it can resell the property and so that the purchaser
can obtain property title insurance; expeditiously ejecting anyone
residing in the property; and, re-selling as quickly as possible to
avoid additional costs and depreciation of the property.5 2
In some areas, the concerns of investor purchasers and of
purchasers intending to reside in the homes overlap. Both sets of
buyers need to acquire clear and inviolate title to the properties at as
low a price as possible. Additionally, neither group desires to
undertake litigation or incur other unexpected costs to fight with
former homeowners or subsequent buyers over title.
However, investors differ from homebuyers in ability to
Chip

Away At REQ Inventory, HOUSING WIRE (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.housingwire.com/2011/11/22/banks-chip-away-at-reo-inventory.
48 Ken Belson, Foreclosure Auctions in Phoenix Show a Raw Form of
available at
2012, at All,
15,
Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/us/foreclosure-auctions-in-phoenix-showcapitalism-at-its-rawest.html (observing: "[T]he auctions have grown into a scruffy
economic circus where bargain hunters from around the world have scooped up
houses often sold for less than half the value of the mortgage.").
49 Dan Immergluck, Distressed and Dumped: Market Dynamics of Low-Value,
Foreclosed Properties during the Advent of the Federal Neighborhood Stabilization
Program, J. OF PLANNING EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 4-5 (Oct. 10, 201),

available at http://jpe.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/10/06/0739456X11423263.
50

Id. at 5.

See, e.g., "Wells Fargo and REO Foreclosures," RealtyTrac,
http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/REO/wells-fargo-reo.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2012)
52
Elizabeth
Weintraub,
Foreclosure
Basics,
(last
http://homebuying.about.com/od/4closureshortsales/qt/093007Foreclos.htm
visited April 24, 2012) (explaining the incentives to quickly sell REO inventory).
5

572
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navigate the system and to manage risk. Investors are sophisticated
and better equipped to discover and assess the risks involved in
buying at foreclosure auctions or from REO inventory. Investor
buyers also may bid lower than home-buyers because they intend to
re-sell or lease out the acquired properties at a profit.53 Home-buyers
may bid higher because they may be more personally invested in the
particular home on the auction block.
Purchaser interests and the legal protections they might
reasonably expect also vary depending upon whether they acquire
bona fide purchaser (BFP) status. BFPs are a subset of purchasers
who act in good faith, pay value, and lack actual and constructive
notice of defects in the sale process or of non-compliance with the
legal and contractual prerequisites to foreclosure. 54 BFPs are
"innocent" buyers who are more deserving of protection against
defects in the sales than mere buyers who are aware of defects in the
process.5 5 State law typically affords BFPs special protections against
subsequent challenges to title. 56 In contests between homeowners and
BFPs, courts and policy makers must weigh these varying concerns.
C. Legal System
The integrity of our legal system depends upon all parties
following the rules. 5 Non-judicial foreclosure rules favor the
5 Motoko Rich, Investors Are Looking to buy Homes by the Thousands, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
2,
2012,
at
BI,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/business/investors-are-looking-to-buy-homesby-the-thousands.html?_r- 1&ref-motokorich (describing the factors that investors
who intend to rent purchased properties take into consideration when deciding upon
their foreclosure bid).
54 For example, California and Massachusetts define a BFP to be one who pays
value and possesses no knowledge, actual or constructive, of irregularities. See
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 896 (Mass. 2011); Melendez v. D & I
Inv., Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1238, 1251-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 424-25 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005). (observing that In order to achieve bona fide status, a purchaser must
pay value in good faith and without actual or constructive notice of another's
rights). In contrast, Arizona defines a BFP as one who pays value without actual
notice of non-compliance with the contract provisions in the deed of trust and the
statutory requirements to foreclose. Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. &
Dev. Corp., 741 P.2d 1234, 1237-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
5 Jacobson-Greany, supra note 7, at 171-72.
56 See discussion in Section III, infra.
5In
discussing the lawsuit that Delaware recently filed against Mortgage
Electronic Registration System ( "MERS" ), Attorney General Biden stated: "A
man or woman's home is not just his or her largest investment, it's their castle.
Rules matter. A homeowner has the obligation to pay the mortgage on time, and
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foreclosing party, but that party must possess the authority to sell the
home-just like landlords and unsecured creditors must prove their
right to evict or to a money judgment. To permit otherwise opens the
door to abuse.
Disturbingly, the form of the abuse arising in the context of
the careless handling of notes and mortgages can rise to the level of
fraud upon the court. For example, the Florida Attorney General
found forged signatures on mortgages and indorsements 5 of notes;
falsifications of dates on mortgage assignments; bogus grantees and
grantors listed on mortgage assignments; and lack of knowledge of
bank employees who signed transfers of notes and mortgages.
Moreover, the investigators discovered that the agents or attorneys
for the foreclosing parties recorded many of these defective or
fraudulent documents and relied upon them in court. 60 Judges
unknowingly used that false information when approving
foreclosures. When this occurs, the judicial system loses credibility
and the buy-in needed to ensure that parties respect and voluntarily
lenders must follow the rules if they are seeking to take away someone's house
through foreclosure." Press Release, Delaware Attorney General, Biden: Private
National Mortgage Registry Violates Delaware Law (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://attomeygeneral.delaware.gov/media/releases/2011/lawl 0-27.pdf See also
Gretchen Morgenson, From East and West, Foreclosure Horror Stories, N.Y.
at
available
Bl,
at
2012,
8,
Jan.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/business/mortgage-servicing-horror-storiesfair-game.html?pagewanted=all (quoting the Nevada Attorney General Catherine
Cortez Maestro in the context of reporting about the lawsuit her office filed against
Lender Processing Services containing allegations of widespread document fraud in
the context of mortgage transactions and foreclosure: "If you are going to allow
banks to skate around the integrity of the system, what kind of justice is that?").
58 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. 308, 330 (1999) (raising the
issue of abuse in the context of refusing to freeze assets in the hands of the debtor
before first obtaining a judgment).
59 I use the spelling of the word "indorsement" as it appears in the Uniform
Commercial Code, § 3-204.
60 Office of the Attorney General of the State of Florida, Economic Crimes
Division, "Unfair, Deceptive and Unconscionable Acts in Foreclosure Cases:
Presentation to the Florida Association of Court Clerks and Controllers" 27-35
http://southfloridalawblog.com/wpat
available
(2010),
content/uploads/2011/01/46278738-Florida-Attomey-General-FraudclosureReport-Unfair-Deceptive-and-Unconscionable-Acts-in-Foreclosure-Cases.pdf
(including actual documents evidencing these practices and highlighting the
example of Linda Green whose signature appears on "hundreds of thousands" of
mortgage assignments and who is listed as an officer of dozens of banks and
mortgage companies; presenting documents in which her signature was forged on
many documents).

574

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 24:4

comply with its mandates.61
D. Property Title Systems
The recording of title to and conveyances of real property in
the United States plays a critical role the American property system:
"The policy justifications behind recording statutes are as germane
today as they were hundreds of year ago when the first American
colonies began adopting the statutes. Society needs an authoritative,
transparent source of information on who owns land to protect
property ri hts, encourage commerce, expose fraud, and avoid
disputes."
State law varies as to when interests in real property other
than deeds must be recorded. For example, Massachusetts does not
require the recording of mortgage assignments; whereas, assignments
must be recorded before the foreclosure sale in Georgia.6 Thus, in
some states, purchasers can discover information about the identity of
the party possessing the right to enforce the mortgage before the sale.
Whether a purchaser can attain BFP status depends, in part, upon
whether it has constructive notice of certain defects, including the
lack of authority to foreclose. Consequently, recordation of mortgage
assignments serves the important public policy of providing
accessible information in advance of a foreclosure sale that can affect
the legal rights of the foreclosing party, the homeowner, and the
purchaser. For these reasons, the accuracy of state recordation
systems is essential.
The challenge, then, is to balance these important interests to
61 Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won't Work, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND
MASS TORTS 244 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (noting that the public perception
that the law is legitimate induces compliance with and respect for the legal system).
62 Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System's Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 122-23
(2011). See also Andy Assoc. v. Banker Trust Co., 299 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (N.Y.
1979) ("[T]he recording act... was enacted to accomplish a twofold purpose. First,
it was intended to protect the rights of innocent purchasers who acquire an interest
in property without knowledge of prior encumbrances.... Second, the statute was
designed to establish a public record which would furnish potential purchasers with
notice, or at least 'constructive notice', of previous conveyances and encumbrances
that might affect their interests.").
63 U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 649-50 (2011) (recognizing
that a mortgage assignment must be in writing although it need not be recorded);
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162(b) (West 2011) (requiring recordation before the
sale).
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protect each to the maximum extent possible.
III. EXAMPLES IN EXISTING STATE LAW OF RULES
AFFECTING HOMEOWNER AND PURCHASER INTERESTS
In this section, I summarize a non-exhaustive collection of
existing state law provisions that address or affect two competing
concerns: those addressing homeowner opportunities to challenge
forced sales and those that create and protect finality of title in the
hands of purchasers. I draw upon the law in Arizona, California,
Georgia, Massachusetts, and Nevada and assess the extent to which
the provisions balance homeowner and purchaser interests. 64
The type of residential real estate security instrument
commonly used in these states varies. The instrument predominantly
used in Arizona, California, and Nevada to secure a debt or
obligation is the deed of trust.6 5 Unlike a mortgage, a deed of trust is
a three-party instrument in which the trustor (borrower) conditionally
conveys title to a third party (trustee) who holds it as security for the
debt owed to the beneficiary (lender). In Georgia, the most common
real estate security instrument is a security deed. 66 The uniform
security deed used in Georgia by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac labels
the homeowner- rantor as the "borrower." The grantee is referred to
as the "lender." Finally, Massachusetts uses mortgages that label
the lender as the mortgagee and the borrower as the mortgagor. When
I identify a particular state's law below and refer to that state's
mortgage security instrument, I will use the applicable generic names
for the parties to that type of instrument where relevant.
A. Pre-Sale Mediation

Several states have adopted some form of Xre-foreclosure
mediation since the advent of the foreclosure crisis. For example,
6 I rely upon the laws of these states because they have the highest seriously
delinquent rates in the nation and because I carefully researched their laws in my
previous article.
65 Renuart, supra note 4, at
*45, *50, *63.
6
Id. at *57.
61 See GEORGIA--Single
Family--Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM
at
3011,
1/01,
available
INSTRUMENT
Form
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/pdf/301 1.pdf

GEOFFREY WALSH, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? (Sept. 2009),
68

available

at
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Nevada's Legislature created a Foreclosure Mediation Program for
owner-occupied residential properties that are subject to foreclosure
notices filed on or after July 1, 2009. "Its purpose is to address the
foreclosure crisis head-on with the hope of keeping Nevada families
in their homes." 69
This procedure is not mandatory. Rather, the homeowner may
elect to participate in the program. 70 Following this election, lenders
must participate in good faith and provide certain documentation to
the mediator and homeowner, including: the original or certified copy
of the deed of trust; the loan note; and each assignment or transfer of
the deed of trust and note. 7 ' The importance of this requirement is
that the lender or the party claiming the right to foreclose must prove
its entitlement before proceeding to sale. Indeed, if the party cannot
show its authority to .foreclose, the mediator cannot certify the
foreclosure action to proceed.72
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosuremortgage/mediation/report-statemediation-programs.pdf (analyzing the strengths and weakness of twenty-five of
these programs) [hereafter Walsh I]; GEOFFREY WALSH, NATIONAL CONSUMER
LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: UPDATES
AND
DEVELOPMENTS
(Jan.
2010),
available
at

http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure-mortgage/mediation/report-statemediation-programs-update.pdf (discussing several additional mediation programs
created in 2009). However, most of these states do not require the production of the
loan note and mortgage-a deficiency that separates them from the Nevada
scheme. Walsh I, supra note 68, at 18-19.
69
See
the Nevada
Judiciary
Foreclosure
Mediation
website:
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/about-foreclosure-mediation.
70
Nev.
Sup.
Ct.
Mediation
R.
5(4),
available
at
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf (last
visited March 11, 2012). The homeowner must pay '/2 of the $400 mediation fee.
Nev. Sup. Ct. Mediation R. 14.
71 Nev. Sup. Ct. Mediation R. 11. (listing the documentation requirements);
Pasillas v HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281,. 1284 (Nev. 2011) (stating that the
parties must mediate in good faith).
72 Pasillas, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011); Leyva v. Nat'l Default Serv. Corp.,
255 P.3d 1275 (Nev. 2011). Data released by the Nevada Judiciary shows that
when the homeowner elected mediation, the program has prevented foreclosures
and kept a significant number of homeowners in their homes, at least for some
period of time. From September 14, 2009 through June 2011, 12,556 mediations
were completed. Of these, 11,057 (88%) did not proceed to foreclosure because the
mediator did not issue a certification for foreclosure; whereas, 1,499 (12%) did
proceed to foreclosure. Of the 11,057 cases, the parties reached an agreement 50%
of the time; in the remainder, a certification for foreclosure was not issued because
of non-compliance with rules or the case was withdrawn. In the cases where the
parties reached an agreement, 66% of the homeowners remain .in their homes.
Foreclosure
Mediation
Factsheet,
available
at
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The documentation production rule motivates all lenders and
their assignees to get their documents in order before proceeding with
residential foreclosures in Nevada, regardless of whether the
homeowner requests mediation. The mere possibility of having to
document the authority to foreclose in a mediation process creates an
important incentive. Those that cannot legitimately present these
documents may be less likely to foreclose. As a result, pre-sale
mediation fulfills three important goals, one explicit and two implicit:
stemming the tide of foreclosures and keeping Nevadans in their
home by encouraging loan workouts, ensuring that only the proper
party ultimately forecloses, and protecting title in the hands of
purchasers.
B. Post-SaleEvidentiaryPresumptionsof Compliance
Once the foreclosing party issues a deed to the purchaser
following a foreclosure sale, state law may create a presumption or
prima facie evidence of compliance with the terms of the security
instrument and certain statutory provisions. Arizona and California
law provide examples. 7 The foreclosure deed is not conclusive
evidence, unless the purchaser is a BFP.74 Significantly though, these
states differ regarding what it takes to become a BFP. Arizona law
states that the purchaser must pay value without actual notice of noncompliance with the contract provisions in the deed of trust and the
statutory requirements to foreclose. 7 Moreover, in Arizona, the
foreclosure deed may not be conclusive where "the notice was
insufficient because of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment." 76
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/fuincstartdown/1937/.
73 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-811(B) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(c)
(West 2011).
74 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-811 (B) (2012); Silving v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064 (D. Ariz. July 7, 2011) (making this distinction);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(c) (West 2011).
75 The purchaser must be without actual notice, as opposed to constructive
notice. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. & Dev. Corp., 741 P.2d
1234, 1237-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that even the named beneficiary in a
deed of trust who purchased at the sale may acquire BFP status where it had no
actual notice that entities who were not parties to the deed of trust were sent the
notice of sale one day late).
7 Main I Ltd. P'ship, 741 P.2d at 1238 (refusing, however, to void a
foreclosure sale on the grounds that the trustee mailed the notice of sale to certain
entities that were not parties to the deed of trust one day late because the purchaser
paid value and took without actual notice, even though it was the beneficiary; no

578

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[Vol. 24:4

In contrast, California requires that a purchaser must pay value in
good faith and be without actual or constructive notice of another's
rights.77 And the presumption (either rebuttable or conclusive) does
not arise when the basis of the challenge relates to non-notice issues,
such as, lack of authority to foreclose and agreements to postpone or
cancel the sale while the parties are negotiating a loan modification
or where the homeowner is making payments under a repayment
plan.7 8
Unquestionably, these statutes enhance the stability of title in
the hands of BFPs. However, they do not eliminate it entirely for two
reasons: first, the purchaser may not qualify for BFP status; and
second, they do not restrict all types of challenges. This is positive
from the homeowner's perspective, because there remain defects in
the non-judicial process that she can raise to void the sale. However,
title to the property is not certain and BFPs are not immune from the
headaches and costs associated with lawsuits. In addition, the type of
notice BFPs must possess to disqualify them from the evidentiary
shield is important. As noted, Arizona protects BFPs quite stringently
by disqualifying them only if they have actual notice. This approach
penrmits purchasers to. put their heads in the sand and to avoid
checking public records for readily available information. In my
view, California's statute more carefully balances the interests of
homeowners and purchasers because it does not confer this special
status on those who fail-or refuse-to review the relevant public
records. 79 Regardless, neither rule protects the interests of
homeowners and purchaser as well as other approaches.

evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment presented).
n Melendez v. D & I Inv., Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 424-45 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (rejecting argument that a purchaser cannot achieve BFP status if the
purchaser is a speculator who frequents foreclosure sales and pays substantially less
than the value of the property).
78 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. La Jolla Group II, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 825, 830-31
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding no presumption where the loan was current due to an
agreement to cure; beneficiary had no right to foreclose under these circumstances;
ruling that the § 2924(C) presumption arises only to notice requirements and not to
every defect or inadequacy short of fraud); Melendez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 428
(ruling that the § 2924 presumption arises when the challenge to the sale relates to
notice issues but not to other matters; finding, however, that repayment agreement
was not orally modified and, consequently, there was no procedural irregularity in
the sale process).
7 Melendez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 428 (discussing the notice rationale and stating
that the purchaser must make "reasonable inquiry").
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C. Post-Sale Challenges
States generally permit a homeowner to contest a foreclosure
sale before it occurs.8 0 Failure to initiate an action ordinarily does not
prevent the homeowner from filing a challenge after the sale-except
in Arizona. There, the homeowner and certain specified parties must
commence an action seeking an injunction before 5:00 p.m. on the
last business day before the scheduled sale. Failure to comply
constitutes a waiver of all defenses and objections to the sale.82 This
provision places these parties on an extremely short leash-either
raise objections before the sale or potentially lose all rights to attack
the sale.8 3
Putting Arizona aside, California, Georia, Massachusetts,
and Nevada permit objections following the sale. Massachusetts
also allows a homeowner to defend himself against eviction when the
sale purchaser brings a summary action for possession.8 5
States place certain burdens upon homeowners when
disputing the validity of the sale. Homeowners may have to tender
the secured debt, the delinquent amount and costs, or plead the
conditions showing that tender is inequitable or that the sale is void
and not merely voidable. 86 Because these suits ordinarily are
This is the case, for example, in Arizona and Massachusetts. See Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 33-811(C)(2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § I (West 2011); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 185, § 1(k) (West 2011); 28 Mass. Prac., Real Estate Law §10.2(2) (4th
ed.).
81 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 33-81 1(C)
(2012).
80

82 Id.

Arizona state courts have not applied this provision in the context of an
attack to a completed sale based upon lack of authority to foreclose and an
allegedly void sale, at least in published decisions. See Renuart, supra note 4, at 47
(discussing several unpublished opinions and the limitations of unpublished
opinions under Arizona law). Notably, at least one court described the Arizona
foreclosure procedure as "draconian." Schrock v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No.
11-CV-0567, 2011 WL 3348227, at *6-8 n. 7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2011) (discussing in
detail the draconian results of the legislative foreclosure regime in the context of
the tort of wrongful foreclosure).
84 Melendez, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (affirming the judgment that the plaintiffs
could not prove their case rather than that the cause of action was not applicable);
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. v. Brown, 583 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 2003)
(relying on GA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10); Lyons v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., No. 09 MISC 416377, 2011 WL 61186 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 4, 2011); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 107.080(5) (West 2011).
S85 Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 951 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 2011) (ruling that the
housing court has jurisdiction to consider the validity of the purchaser's title).
86 Miller & Starr, supra note 42, at § 10:212.
83
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equitable in nature, unreasonable delays in the initiation of such
actions may trigger the defense of laches. 87 In Nevada, homeowners
cannot file such a challenge more than ninety days following the
sale.8 8
Non-judicial foreclosure states recognize the necessity of
permitting post-sale challenges by homeowners. However, without a
clear filing deadline, the ambiguity related to whether and when title
challenges might arise create uncertainty. Nevada presents a better
solution, by allowing homeowners to challenge the foreclosure in
court, but only for a specified time. In the next Part, I discuss why
ninety days is too short.
D. Post-Sale ConfirmationHearing
Georgia requires a post-sale confirmation hearing only when
the foreclosing party wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment in the
event that the sale proceeds do not cover the amount owed by the
homeowner. 89 Within thirty days after the sale, the foreclosing party
reports the results of the sale to the court and requests an order of
confirmation. A hearing must follow at which the court considers
evidence of the true market value of the property, the legality of the
notice and advertisements, and the "regularity" of the sale.9 0
This version of a post-sale hearing does little to protect the
interests of homeowners because its occurrence depends solely upon
the decision of the foreclosing party. If that party does not seek a
deficiency, there is no readily available forum in which a homeowner
may raise issues of the "regularity" or "legality" of the sale. The
homeowner must commence a separate case to challenge the sale and
raise grounds that void the sale to the BFP. The interests of the BFP
are not served because the foreclosing party's failure to seek a
deficiency does not eradicate the homeowner's rights to contest the
sale. Even so, the idea of a post-sale hearing has merit, as discussed
in Part IV.B.
IV. POLICY SOLUTIONS THAT (MORE) EQUITABLY BALANCE
THESE INTERESTS
The provisions existing in the laws of the states mentioned
Lamas v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 245 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1978).
88 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(5) (West
2011).
89 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(a) (West 2011).
90 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(b) (West 2011).
87
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above address the interests of homeowners and purchasers in
different ways, often at the expense of one or the other. In this
section, I build upon the state laws outlined above that most equitably
balance these concerns and offer a menu of new solutions for
consideration by state legislatures. I propose these suggestions for use
in non-judicial foreclosure states, with the exception of pre-sale
mediation. Title trouble and the right of homeowners to contest the
potential loss of their homes do not arise in the same ways or to the
same extent in judicial foreclosure states. 91 However, pre-sale
mediation creates positive outcomes for all stake-holders in both
types of states.
A. Pre-SaleMediation
With one important change, Nevada's program equitably
balances the concerns of homeowners and purchasers by: stemming
the tide of foreclosures and keeping Nevadans in their home by
encouraging loan workouts; ensuring that only the proper party
ultimately forecloses; and protecting title in the hands of purchasers.
Mediation is pro-active because of its timing, i.e., before the sale. It
also benefits the foreclosing party because that party receives a green
light on the question of authority to foreclose if the mediator certifies
the foreclosure. If the parties agree to a loan modification, the
homeowner makes payments and losses are reduced or eliminated.
The program should be mandatory so it can realize its full
potential and spread these positive outcomes to all initiating and
facing foreclosure. The cost of the mediator ($400) is split by the
homeowner and foreclosing party. The cost burden on those parties is
small given the opportunities the process provides for saving homes
and reducing lender losses. The cost to the state, though, will rise
because it likely will hire additional staff to oversee the increase in
cases.92 Nevada covers program costs by collecting a $200 fee when
91 Compare John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws
Deprive Homeowners of Basic Protections, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENT, 11-12

at
available
2009),
(Feb.
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosuremortgage/statelaws/foreclosingdream-report.pdf (discussing the benefits of judicial foreclosure), with Debra
Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and
Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposalfor Reform, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
639, 643-47 (1997) (articulating lender concerns about the higher costs and
inefficiencies inherent in judicial foreclosures).
92 Fourteen staff and one deputy director process election/waiver Forms,
schedule mediations, process certificate requests, and handle mediation fees.
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the foreclosing party files a notice of default. 93 Non-judicial
foreclosure states that presently do not require pre-sale mediation will
bear higher costs related to creating the program and the
infrastructure to support it but, like Nevada, can generate income to
offset these expenses. Nonetheless, the benefits outweigh the costs
by reducing foreclosures and post-sale title challenges. 94
B. Post-Sale Challenge v. Post-Sale ConfirmationHearing
Nevada's statute offers homeowners an opportunity to reverse
the foreclosure sale and retain title but severely limits the time in
which a challenge must be initiated-to ninety days. Moreover,
distressed homeowners bear the burden of filing the lawsuit to undo a
sale that occurred without any judicial oversight ex ante.
A more equitable approach to post-sale challenges is to
require a confirmation hearing in every case. In contrast to Georgia's
hearing procedure triggered only by lenders who seek a deficiency, I
suggest that a post-sale confirmation hearing occur following every
residential foreclosure sale in non-judicial states. The scope of the
hearing should be broad: to review whether the foreclosing party
possessed the authority to foreclose (particularly where the state has
not implemented a mandatory pre-sale mediation program like that in
Nevada); to determine whether all legal and contractual prerequisites
to the sale were properly performed; to assess whether there were
other irregularities that should reverse the sale; to confirm any
deficiency and distribute any surplus; and, to ratify the sale deed. The
parties must produce documents relevant to these issues. All parties
have the right to appear, including the purchaser. The hearing should
be held within a relatively short time after the sale, say, up to six

at
available
Staff
Information,
Program
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/about-program/75.
93 Geoff Walsh, Rebuilding America: How States Can Save Millions of Homes
Through Foreclosure Mediation, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENT, 35 (Feb. 2012),
at
available
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosuremortgage/mediation/reportforeclosure-mediation.pdf (noting that the state directs approximately $43 of the fee
to cover mediation program costs and $150 to general revenue; further reporting
that Nevada collected over $6 million in its first year).
94
Id. at 20-22 (citing to evidence supporting the utility of mediation programs
because they frequently result in loan modifications that are more cost-effective to
the participants and to municipalities and the state than foreclosures).
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months. 9 Following the hearing and any applicable appeal deadlines,
the sale is final and title is certain. If homeowners do not raise defects
in the sale at the hearing, they are waived.
The benefits of such a process are readily apparent. First, a
judicial procedure is not required until after the sale, preserving the
non-judicial nature of the process until that point in time. Second, the
hearing is automatic. At the hearing, the court scrutinizes the legality
of the sale. If there are no defects, the court confirms good title in the
hands of the purchaser in most cases. Third, purchasers do not obtain
title until the court confirms the sale deed.
Like Nevada's mediation program, this review provides the
incentive to foreclosing parties to follow the relevant laws and
contract provisions governing their conduct during the foreclosure
process or risk reversal of the sale. While this produces a period of
uncertainty, the strong likelihood of confirmed title and finality
within a relatively short time is an immense benefit to purchasers.
The burden on the judicial system inevitably will rise, though
the size of the load will wax and wane with the economic stress
experienced in each state at any given time. To offset these costs,
states can collect a surcharge when certain foreclosure-related
documents are recorded, similar to Nevada' s approach. 9 6
Despite the cost, states should institute both a pre-sale
mediation program and a post-sale mandatory confirmation hearing
procedure. In combination, these procedures afford timely protection
to homeowners against unwarranted sales and the opportunity to
negotiate a loan modification. 97 The integrity of the legal and
property recordation systems are preserved and clear title to
purchasers is ensured.
9
The lack of finality following a foreclosure sale is not unusual and
knowledgeable purchasers operate under this understanding. For one thing, some
states do not impose a specified time limit upon post-foreclosure challenges. See
Part III.C. For another, about thirteen states provide homeowners with a statutory
right of redemption-"a fixed period of time in which to set the foreclosure sale
aside and regain title to the home by paying the foreclosure sale price, interest, and
costs of the sale." JOHN RAO, ET AL, FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND
MORTGAGE SERVICING § 14.1.2.1 (National Consumer Law Center 3d ed. 2010)
(identifying these states and stating that the redemption periods range from three
months to two years, the most typical period being one year following the sale).
96 See discussion in Part IV.A, supra.
97 Keeping homeowners in their homes and turning delinquent mortgage loans
into performing loans benefits not only the immediate parties to the transaction.
Neighborhoods and municipalities avoid the negative impacts of an increasing
number of vacant homes. GAO Report, supra note 5, at 41-42 (noting that vacant
homes increase the likelihood of "crime, blight, and declining property values).
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C. Recordation Requirements andPurchaserDuties to Review
Public Records
States should place more responsibility upon purchasers to
search public records for notice of defects related to the sale and title.
Buying property at foreclosure sales is "notoriously" risky.98 These
buyers often are savvy investors who factor known risks into the
amount they bid for properties. 9 9 Arizona's standard, that BFPs must
lack only actual knowledge, unfairly allows a protected class of
purchasers to actively avoid acquiring knowledge of defects, even
when it appears in public records. California more equitably balances
the responsibilities of purchasers by attributing publicly available
knowledge to them. Thus, imposing a duty to search for defects in
public records is reasonable given the enhanced legal protections
afforded to BFPs.
In addition to the duty to search, states should mandate that
assignments of the security instrument be recorded prior to the
initiation of the non-judicial foreclosure process. Georgia amended
its laws accordingly in 2008 to ensure that a foreclosure be conducted
by the current owner or holder of the mortgage, as reflected by public
records.' 00
Unlike mortgages and related assignment documents, no state
presently compels the recordation of loan notes, indorsements,
allonges, or other documents related to note transfers before the sale.
Historically, the loan note and mortgage traveled together. When
mortgage loans were securitized at an increasingl' rapid pace,
financial firms often deviated from this practice. o Under the
common law, a mortgage may be enforced only by, or on behalf of, a
person who is entitled to enforce the obligation, i.e., the note, the
mortgage secures. 102
As a general rule, the party who possesses the right to enforce
both the note and the mortgage may sue on the debt or foreclose on
98 Jacobson-Greany, supra note 7, at 171-72 (stating that purchasers may have
to pay in cash in part or in full without any opportunity to inspect before bidding).
99 Id. at 172 (noting that knowledgeable purchasers decline to bid based on the
risks or take the risk into account when bidding).
100 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162(b) (West 2011; 2008 Georgia Laws Act 576
(S.B. 531) (stating the purpose of the amendment).
101 Renuart, supra note 4, at *27-*29 (identifying the legal problems that arise
when the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, used by a large portion of the
mort age market players, is listed as the nominee of the lender in a mortgage).
02 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGE) § 5.4(c)
(1997).
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the security upon default by the borrower. Because the note is so
important, states should require recordation of the note and related
documents before a party may initiate a foreclosure.103 In tandem
with the recordation of mortgage assignments, the public can
determine who has the right to foreclose at any given moment and
purchasers can more accurately assess the risk of bidding at sales
where proof of authority to foreclose is absent.
V. CONCLUSION
In the context of a non-judicial foreclosure process, changes
in the law can reduce the risk of wrongful foreclosures. The
foreclosing party must possess the right to oust the homeowner.
Without assurances of obtaining clear title, bonafide purchasers face
title uncertainty. I propose modest additions to existing state law
rather than a comprehensive overhaul, given the significantly lower
likelihood of the success of the latter approach. The stakes are high
for all parties involved in foreclosures. The right's and interests of
homeowners and purchasers deserve a fresh review.

It is worth noting that the recordation of note-related documents will trigger
recordation fees that, in turn, will increase governmental revenue.
103

